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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
AFFIDAVITS-ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS--TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONE.-The
defendants executed a mortgage and subsequently mortgaged the same
premises to a bank. In a foreclosure suit the defendant contended that the
first deed was void because the acknowledgement by his wife was made over
the telephone. Held, that such acknowledgements by the wife over the
telephone were good. Abernathy v. Harris (Ark. 1931) 34 S. W. (2d) 765.
The prevailing rule is that where statutes require a personal appearance
and privy examination before a proper officer for an acknowledgement, one
taken over the telephone is void. Roach v. Francisco (1917) 138 Tenn.
357, 197 S. W. 1097; Southern State Bank v. Sumner (1924) 187 N. C.
762, 122 S. E. 848; Hutchinson v. Stone (1920) 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151;
Meyers v. Eby (1920) 33 Idaho 266, 193 Pac. 77, 12 A. L. R. 535. The
deed under such circumstances is void. Robinson v. Bruner (1927) 94 Fla.
797, 114 So. 556.
However there is some authority to the effect that in the absence of fraud,
duress or mistake, a deed acknowledged over the telephone is valid. Ban-
ning v. Banning (1889) 80 Cal. 271, 22 Pac. 210. This may be so even
where the statute requires an appearance before the proper officer. Wooten
v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank (1923) 158 Ark. 179, 249 S. W. 569.
Where there is an appearance and an acknowledgement of the deed in some
manner, it is conclusive, and evidence is inadmissible to impeach the cer-
tificate as against an innocent holder. Meger v. Gossett (1882) 38 Ark. 377.
Ordinarily, affidavits taken over the telephone are void. Sullivan v. First
National Bank (1904) 37 Tex. Civ. A. 288, 835 S. W. 421; Cames v. Camnes
(1912) 138 Ga. 1, 74 S. E. 785. Notaries taking such acknowledgements will be
guilty of professional misconduct and of violation of public duty. In re
Napolis (1915) 169 App. Div. 469, 155 N. Y. S. 416. But where a les-
sor executed a lease and received the rent for four years, an attempt to re-
pudiate the agreement upon the ground that it was acknowledged over the
telephone was unsuccessful. Logan Gas. Co. v. Keith (1927) 117 Ohio 206,
158 N. E. 184, 58 A. L. R. 600. And where notice of injuries was required
to be given to the city as a condition precedent to instituting an action
against it, it was held that the action could be maintained even though
the affidavit in the notice was taken over the telephone. Kuhn v. City of
St. Joseph (Mo. App. 1921) 234 S. W. 353, 7 ST. Louis L. REv. 187.
The instant case seems to be contrary to the purpose and intent of an
acknowledgement, namely, that by it the grantor states the act evidenced
by the instrument to be his act or deed. It hardly seems possible that one
can state an act or deed to be his, when he is talking over the telephone
without having the deed before him. T. L., '32.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CONTINGENT FEE LIEN-SECRET SETTLEMENT BY
CLIENT.-A personal injury suit was compromised by the plaintiff without
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his attorney's knowledge or consent. Held, under the Oklahoma statutes,
R. S. Okla. (1921) sec. 4103, the attorney may sue in equity the former de-
fendant for the amount due under his contingent fee lien and that the extent
of his lien is to be measured by the amount of the probable recovery in the
principal action. Sterling Milk Products Co. v. Brown (Okla. 1930) 294
Pac. 117.
The result in the present case is based entirely upon the terms of the
Oklahoma statute, because at common law the attorney's lien did not attach
until there was a judgment. Beecher v. Peter A. Vogt Manufacturing Co.
(1920) 227 N. Y. 669, 125 N. E. 831; Levy v. Public Service Railway Co.
(1918) 91 N. J. L. 183, 193 AtI. 171. However, statutes giving the attorney
a lien of some sort in case of a secret settlement between the parties exist
in every state. The Alabama courts, under the statute in that state, have
reached a similar result to that in the principal case. Alabama Fuel &
Iron Co. v. Denson (1922) 208 Ala. 337, 94 So. 311. In Texas a similar re-
sult is reached when the contract between a client and his attorney involves
a partial assignment of the cause of action rather than a mere contingent
fee agreement. Gibson v. Texas Pacific Coal Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)
266 S. W. 137.
The above cases represent the correct rule in but a small minority of the
states. In Missouri the amount of the lien is specifically limited in the
statute which creates it to the agreed percent of the settlement. R. S. Mo.
(1929) sees. 11716 and 11717. This is the general doctrine. Conklin v.
Conklin (1922) 201 App. Div. 170, 190 N. Y. S. 685; Downey v. Northern
Padfic Railroad Co. (1924) 72 Mont. 166, 232 Pac. 531. The attorney can
recover more than the consideration recited in the release if he can show
that the real consideration was greater, unless the release contains an ex-
press stipulation that the recited consideration is the sole one. Whitehall
v. Aurora (1909) 139 Mo. 597, 123 S. W. 1045; Hurr v. Metropolitan Street
Railroad Co. (1910) 141 Mo. App. 217, 124 S. W. 1057. If the defendant in
the secret settlement agrees to pay plaintiff's lawyers, some states allow
the attorney to recover the stipulated percent of the total amount the de-
fendant is obligated to pay (the "settlement" plus the fee to the plaintiff's
lawyers). Whitecotton v. St. Louis & Hannibal Railroad Co. (1913) 250
Mo. 624, 157 S. W. 770; Case v. Emmerson-Brantingham Co. (1915) 269
Ill. 94, 109 N. E. 671. Other states hold that the attorney gets only a fee
on the amount paid to his client. Proctor v. Louisville & Nashville Rail-
road Co. (1913) 156 Ky. 465, 161 S. W. 519; Ward v. Donovan (1923) 235
N. Y. 240, 139 N. E. 254.
The client may settle at any time provided he acts in good faith, any
clause in the contract of employment prohibiting such a settlement being
void as against public policy. Beagles v. Robertson (1909) 135 Mo. App.
306, 115 S. W. 1042; Boyd v. Johnson (1924) 145 Md. 385, 125 AtI. 697. If
the settlement was made with an intent to defraud the attorney, the courts
will exercise their common-law powers and allow the attorney to intervene
and continue the suit so that the amount of his fee can be determined.
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Barthels v. Garrels (1921) 206 Mo. App. 199, 227 S. W. 910; Frear v. Lewis
(1922) 201 App. Div. 660, 195 N. Y. S. 3.
Where the settlement was made in good faith, there is great conflict as
to what is the attorney's proper remedy. In Missouri his only action is a
suit at law, as the settlement extinguishes the principal cause of action.
Mills v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co. (1920) 282 Mo. 118, 221 S. W. 1.
In New York the proper relief is by a summary proceeding in equity to
foreclose the lien. In re Reisfeld (1919) 187 App. Div. 223, 175 N. Y. S.
365. Several jurisdictions allow intervention in the original suit. Schutt
v. Bush (1920) 210 Mich. 495, 178 N. W. 48; Johnson v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co.
(1921) 149 Ark. 670; 234 S. W. 979. In Oklahoma the attorney can get
the original suit reinstated but must do so before the expiration of the
term of court in which it was dismissed; otherwise his only remedy against
the former defendant is a proceeding in equity. Wood v. Hines (1927)
117 Okla. 86, 245 Pac. 846.
The situation in Oklahoma is somewhat anomalous. The statute obvious-
ly tends to prevent secret settlements by making the amount of fees for
which the defendant is liable uncertain. By the holding that the new
suit against the former defendant should be in equity, a judge is put in the
position of having to fix the amount of damages that would probably have
been assessed by a jury. G. W. S., '33.
CONSTITUTIOiwAL LAw-JuRY TRIAL-PTY OFFENSES IN THE FEDERAML
CouRTs.-The defendant was charged with having operated a motor ve-
hicle over a public highway recklessly at a greater speed than twenty-two
miles an hour, contrary to statute, in such manner and condition as to en-
danger property and individuals. Having been denied a jury trial by the
police court of the District of Columbia, the defendant appealed. The de-
cision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which was sustained by the Su-
preme Court. Held, driving an automobile recklessly so as to endanger
life and property is a "crime" within the constitutional provision guaran-
teeing jury trial. District of Columbia v. Colts (1930) 51 S. Ct. 52.
Constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right of trial by jury insure
the right as it existed at common law. Ex parte Mana (1918) 178 Cal.
213, 172 Pac. 986; Jernigan v. Garrett (1923) 115 Ga. 390, 117 S. E. 327;
Laska v. Chicago Rys. Co. (1925) 318 Ill. 570, 149 N. E. 469.
Some 170 minor offenses in colonial Massachusetts were punished in the
first instance by the unaided magistrate. HILKEy, LEGAL DEVEILOPMENT IN
COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS (1910) 37 COLUMBIA UNI. STUDIES, cited in
Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and Trial by Jury (1926)
39 HARV. L. REv. 917,940. Such was also the case in most of the other colonies
where, because of the general inability to pay heavy fines and lack of man-
power to guard jails, it was necessary to inflict light penalties in all except very
serious offenses. Frankfurter and Corcoran, above. It is known that at the
time of the drafting the Constitution the Committee on Detail deliberated be-
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